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July 31, 1952


NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE

to the Holders of

PSB D-21

Enclosure No. 4 to this Document, the Berlin Supplement, referred to in the covering letter of July 29 from the Director to the Members of the Board (page 1, line 11), is temporarily withdrawn, pending further consideration. Holders may keep the enclosure until notified otherwise.

This note will be attached by the holder to his identically numbered copy of the document.


Edmund J. Bennett
Major, USAF
Acting Executive Officer

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NSC review(s) completed.

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July 29, 1952

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David K. E. Bruce
Under Secretary of State

The Honorable William C. Foster
Deputy Secretary of Defense

General Walter Bedell Smith
Director of Central Intelligence

In accordance with the Board's instructions of December 20, 1951, a National Psychological Strategy Plan for Germany has been completed and is submitted herewith. This Plan has been prepared and unanimously approved by Panel "F", consisting of designated officers of the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Director for Mutual Security and my own staff. While formal chairmanship of the Panel has been held first by Henry A. Byroade, then by James W. Riddleberger, the acting chairman throughout has been Geoffrey W. Lewis, Deputy Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State.

I submit the Plan with the strong recommendation that Sections I through VI, and the Berlin Supplement be approved by the Board. Annex A, together with a supporting paper, is attached for information only and has no authoritative character.

In presenting the Plan I should like to draw the attention to the Board to the following points:

1. Page 13, Section V, Paragraph 2 of the Plan makes the following significant statement:

"We must adjust our approach in accordance with the changes in public opinion and with impressions and impacts which various political, economic and cultural issues have on the German psychological climate. This will require a major effort of imagination on the part of the U.S. operating agencies to develop new and more effective forms of psychological activities, and it implies a constant review of existing programs--included those recommended hereafter--in the light of their demonstrated effectiveness or ineffectiveness."

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I particularly welcome this recognition by the Panel of the need for developing a more imaginative approach in our psychological operations directed at Germany, and I am satisfied that if the Board approves the Plan, the coordinating committee, which I propose to set up by suitably modifying the present Panel, will vigorously stimulate operational planning along these lines. I am all the more confident of this since I am informed that the Panel, especially in the last phase of its work, has developed into a smoothly-functioning and constructively-oriented inter-agency team. The fact that this team has been formed may well be more important in terms of PSB's over-all mission, than any individual plan it produces. In any case, the coordination phase of this Plan will be particularly significant.

2. Page 13, Section V, Paragraph 3 of the Plan stresses the need for a psychological strategy plan for Western Europe into which the German and other European plans can be integrated. The same point is made in the Chairman's letter of transmittal, copy of which is attached. As I am confident that the Board will give due weight to the Panel's recommendations on this point, I have raised no objection to the deletion from the final Plan of various actions applicable to Western Europe as a whole, which were originally proposed by my representative on the Panel. I wish, however, to associate myself most vigorously with the recommendations^{of} the Panel since I feel that the objectives of the German Plan can be achieved only if they are supported by--and conducted within the framework of--a psychological strategy for Western Europe.

I have already instructed my staff, in consultation with member agencies, particularly the Department of State, to begin at once a preliminary study to determine the most fruitful approach in framing such an over-all psychological strategy plan for Western Europe. I hope in the near future to be able to submit to the Board a formal recommendation for setting up such a planning panel.

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3. As the Board will note, the Plan emphasizes psychological operations in a narrow sense of the term and may appear somewhat weak in the broader aspects of psychological strategy. While recognizing the need for propaganda by deed rather than merely by words (Page 14, Section V, Paragraph h), it contains few significant recommendations or suggestions for psychological actions in the political and economic fields. This is partly due to the deletion of certain actions proposed by the Mutual Security Agency representative and my own, but again I have acquiesced in these deletions because I feel that the actions in question more properly belong in the over-all Western European plan which I hope the Board will eventually authorize.

4. Questions have arisen during the work of this Panel which indicate that there is some uncertainty among member agencies as to the scope of PSB's responsibilities. The German Panel has wisely concentrated on constructive work and given little time to discussing such problems of jurisdiction, but I feel that future PSB panels may be handicapped if their members are more concerned with whether they have a right to make constructive suggestions than with actually making them. My own feeling is that PSB panels should be given some fairly general definition of PSB's mission as a starting point, but that they should be cautioned against attempting to apply it too rigorously, thus leaving it to the Board itself to decide what may properly be included in a PSB plan, and what use, if any, can be made of recommendations which it may feel are beyond its competence to approve. Any informal Board comments on these points would be helpful to me.

5. Panel "F" has been notable for the extensive use it has made of outside consultants, who I feel have made a valuable contribution. In addition to rather **extensive referrals** to the field, such as the State Department's transmittal of working drafts to HICOG, the consultants utilized by my staff were:

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Mr. J. Wallace Carroll	Exec. Editor, Journal-Sentinel, Winston Salem, N.C.
Dr. Hans Speier	Rand Corporation
Mr. W. Phillips Davidson	" "
Dr. Stefan P. Possony	Georgetown University
Dr. Walter Rostow	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Col. Charles A. H. Thomson	Brookings Institution
Mr. H. Van Buren Cleveland	Committee for Economic Development
Mr. John Haskell	Vice Pres., New York Stock Exchange
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger	Harvard University

At our request, Dr. Kissinger, following a recent trip to Germany, has written a memorandum which is attached to Annex A. While this report is intended mainly as background material for operational planners in the coordination phase of the Plan, Board members may find it interesting.

6. The attached Plan represents the first product of a new working method which my staff has developed in conjunction with the Department of State and other member agencies. Not only has the Panel been chaired by a representative of the Department of State, but the major part of the actual drafting has been accomplished by a special State Department working party under the direction of Dr. Henry J. Kellermann. The PSB staff role has been a catalytic rather than a directing one, and my representatives on the Panel have concentrated largely on attempting, through the use of non-governmental consultants and in other ways, to discover or develop fresh ideas of possible application to the Panel's task. I consider that this highly significant experiment has proved successful in the present case, and feel that major credit for this success should be given to Mr. Lewis and the members of the State Department working party. At the same time, I should like to

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acknowledge the very substantial and constructive contribution made by the CIA members of the Panel.



Raymond B. Allen
Director

3 x Enclosures:

1. Cy of Letter of Transmittal fr J. W. Riddleberger, State to Director, PSB dated 7/30/52.
2. PSB D-21 dtd 7/28/52 Working Draft #4, "Psychological Strategy Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with Respect to Germany." Cy 42.
3. PSB D-21 dtd 7/28/52 - Annex A "Summary and Analysis" with supporting paper entitled "Notes on Germany" by H. A. Kissinger, Harvard University. (Undated) Cy —.
4. ~~PSB D-21, Suppl. No. 1 dtd 7/24/52 Working Draft #4 "Psychological Strategy Plan Prescribing Specific Courses of Action with Respect to Soviet Harassment of Berlin." Cy 42.~~

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington 25, D.C.

July 30, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Subject: Transmittal of Panel "F" Plan

Ad Hoc Task Panel "F" having completed its preparation of a Plan for Germany in accordance with Terms of Reference (PSB D-21/1 dated March 21, 1952) and Staff Memorandum "Organization of Task Panel F", submits the Subject Plan to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, for his consideration.

Annex B (Covert), which is still under preparation, will be furnished at a subsequent date and should not delay consideration of this Plan by the Psychological Strategy Board.

The Panel recommends that the Psychological Strategy Board authorize the preparation of a "Psychological Strategy Plan for Western Europe and the Atlantic Community", and that the purpose of this Plan be closely integrated with the Subject Plan for Germany.

(signed) James W. Riddleberger,
Chairman,
Ad Hoc Task Panel "F"

Enclosure:

Working Draft PSB D-21,

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(For PSB Consideration only)

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PSB D-21

July 28 1952

COPY NO. 42

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

Washington 25, D. C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN

Prescribing Specific Courses of Action

with respect to

GERMANY

SECTION I

PROBLEM

To prescribe specific courses of action with respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c) the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

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(For PSB Consideration
only)


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PSB D-21
July 26, 1952

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY PLAN

with respect to

GERMANY



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ANNEX A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

ANNEX B COVERT ANNEX (for limited distribution only)

SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 BERLIN

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SECTION II

APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES

As set forth in NSC 20/4, NSC Actions No. 212, No. 266a, NSC 115,
NSC 68/4, NSC 86/1, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

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SECTION IIISummary and Analysis
(to be supplied in full as Annex A)A - ASSUMPTIONS

Our psychological strategy outlined in this paper is based on the following assumptions:

1. Overall strategy:

That our actions in Germany can succeed only if they are conceived as an integral part of overall United States strategy, especially in the context of a European Community, to build up positions of strength from which to reduce Soviet-Communist expansionism and aggression.

2. Balance of Power:

That Western capability to support this strategy is likely to increase within the next two to three years, but not necessarily to a degree which would assure a relationship of forces between the Western nations and the Soviet Union which would permit successful negotiations with the Soviet Union.

3. Cold War :

That the present state of tension between the Soviet bloc and the West may increase in intensity, and that the Soviet Union will feel free to employ all of its capabilities for lures and pressures on the West, short of deliberately provoking general war.

4. Integration:

That the process of integrating the Federal Republic with the Western European Community through the EDC, the Schuman Plan, the Contractual Agreements, the Council of Europe, and similar instrumentalities will involve continued difficulties, during which ratification of the Agreements and their implementation may be slowed down and impeded by oppositionist elements within and outside the Federal Republic, and that the Soviet Union will encourage elements in the Federal Republic and other European countries to delay and obstruct the process of integration.

5. Contractuals:

That the present coalition government will honor the Agreements, when they come into force, but that it will be subject, by coalition members and the Opposition, to demands for liberalization; that there will be continuing pressure for abandonment of reserved rights; and that, in connection with the 1953 election campaign, there will be increased demands for a revision of the Contractual Agreements and other commitments with the West.

6. German Unity and the Peace Treaty:

That it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to agree with the Soviet Union on a formula guaranteeing a satisfactory basis for the unification of Germany and for the conclusion of a peace treaty; but that the Soviet Union may continue to use diplomatic and propaganda channels to press for quadripartite negotiation of a peace treaty as well as East-West German discussions on unity.

7. Berlin:

That the Western Powers will maintain their position in Berlin; but that the situation in Berlin and in particular the morale and standard-of-living of the Berlin population may be severely affected by the Soviet attrition strategy.

8. Soviet Zone and East Berlin:

That the population of the Soviet Zone will remain fundamentally opposed to communism but that the Soviet Union, through its East German puppet authorities will continue to tighten its controls, isolate Eastern Germany from the West, and proceed with its attempts to set up a satellite state with an army of its own.

9. German Military and Economic Potential:

That the build-up of an integrated German military force in the Federal Republic will proceed substantially as contemplated but will require pressure from the West, especially since the required draft legislation and the actual organization of the forces will be subject to continued criticism and resistance by the Opposition; also that any rearmament in the Federal Republic will be

accompanied or preceded by a build-up of an East German army, designed to instill apprehensions of civil war and to cancel out the Federal Republic's military contribution to Western defense.

10. Western Europe:

That attempts to promote Federal Republic integration into Western Europe will be inadequate unless they are supported by— and closely coordinated with—parallel attempts to promote the integration of Western Europe, particularly France, into a community which will be capable of accepting the Federal Republic as a partner.

11. France:

That the Federal Republic's capability for leadership within a unified Western European community will be feared by France, unless potential German predominance in a united Europe is compensated by closer and more organic ties between Europe and the United States within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community.

12. Eastern Europe:

That the Soviet-orbit countries are firmly under Soviet control now and will be in the foreseeable future; that their liberation will come about only as a result of a major change in the existing relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers; and that their peoples generally entertain hopes for eventual liberation from Soviet domination but, especially in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, fear a possible renewal of German domination.

B - OBJECTIVES

NOTE: The order of priority and emphasis is based on U.S. policies reflecting the present world situation.

1. Concerning the Federal Republic:

- a. To maintain and develop friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the United States and the Federal Republic

of Germany.

b. To encourage and facilitate effective participation by the Federal Republic on ^a basis of equality in the European Community, itself included in a developing Atlantic Community, and a contribution by the Federal Republic to the political, economic, and social welfare, as well as to the defense structure, necessary to a strong and durable Europe.

c. In the event of unification on terms acceptable to the West, the above objectives will apply to all of Germany.

2. Concerning West Berlin

To maintain and reinforce our political, economic, cultural, and psychological position in the western sectors of Berlin; and to nullify Soviet efforts to harass the population and to disturb and undermine the normal life of the city.

3. Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin

To maintain contact with the population in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin in order to stiffen their spirit of resistance to Soviet-Communist rule and thus (a) to weaken the political, economic, and military system in the Soviet Zone; and (b) to lay the ground work for eventual incorporation in the free Western Community.

4. Concerning German Unity

To demonstrate U.S. support of German unity attained by peaceful means; and

To frustrate Soviet-Communist efforts to obtain control of all of Germany and eventually to bring about Soviet withdrawal from Germany.

5. Concerning Eastern Europe

To maintain contact with the people of Germany's Eastern European neighbors in order (a) to stiffen their spirit of resistance and thus weaken the Soviet system of political, economic, and military control of these countries, and (b) to sustain their hopes for eventual liberation and inclusion in an all-European Community free of domination by Germany, the U.S.S.R. or any other Power.

SECTION IV

TASKS

The following are the Tasks of our psychological strategy in support of the achievement of our objectives:

1. Concerning the Federal Republic

a. To facilitate the transformation of the Allied-German relationship on the diplomatic, political, and economic as well as military level from the occupation status toward that of equal partners and allies.

b. To foster, encourage, support and facilitate efforts of the population and the Government of the Federal Republic toward the integration of their political, economic, cultural, and military interests with those of the European Community and the Atlantic Community; to help pave the way for acceptance by other governments and peoples (particularly French) for participation by the Federal Republic in the development of the European and Atlantic Communities.

c. To support the development in the Federal Republic of democratic institutions, and to assist the German democratic elements in their opposition to authoritarian and extremist elements.

d. To gain the support of the German people and government for U.S. policies, and to strengthen their will to resist and their confidence in the ability of the U.S. (and the West) to frustrate Soviet-Communist aggression.

e. To stimulate maximum Federal Republic contribution to the development of increased military and economic strength in Western Europe.

f. To convince the Germans of the need to weaken Soviet aggressive capabilities by impeding the flow of strategic materials to East Germany and the Soviet bloc; and to provide Western markets and raw materials to the Federal Republic.

2. Concerning Berlin

a. To demonstrate to the Soviet Union, the Berliners, the Germans, and the rest of the world our right, ability, and

determination to maintain the Allied and West Berliners' position in and access to Berlin.

b. To exploit the continued existence of a free West Berlin as a "show window of democracy", and as a base of psychological operations in the Soviet Zone and beyond it in the Soviet orbit in order to weaken the Soviet influence throughout Germany, and particularly in order to encourage and strengthen resistance to Soviet rule in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.

c. In order to maintain the morale of the Berlin population and strengthen their diplomatic, political, cultural, and economic ties with the West in the face of increasing Soviet pressures, to plan and coordinate jointly with the U.K., French, and the Federal Republic governments, psychological measures to nullify the Soviet harassments, and to enlist and build up the active interest of governmental and private elements throughout the free world in support of Berlin's cause as a symbol of free-world unity of purpose.

d. To stimulate and assist the Federal Republic to provide maximum economic and psychological support for West Berlin.

3. Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin

a. To encourage in the Soviet Zone disaffection towards the regime and defection from the East German military or para-military forces.

b. To reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet and Communist administrative and control apparatus by conducting in a non-attributable manner psychological, political, and economic harassment activities in the Soviet Zone, and to prepare, under controlled conditions, for such more active forms of resistance as may later be authorized.

c. To keep the population informed of world events and of U.S. and Western policies, particularly with respect to Germany.

d. To maintain hope in the Soviet Zone population for a

unified and democratic Germany integrated within the European Community.

c. To weaken the confidence and ability of the Soviet authorities and Communist leaders to maintain or expend their controls in the Soviet Zone, or their influence in West Berlin or the Federal Republic.

4. Concerning German Unity

a. To demonstrate our willingness to initiate and enter, jointly with the French and U.K. Governments, in negotiations with the Soviet Union for German unification under conditions guaranteeing a unified Germany with a democratic government established by free democratic elections, provided that a reasonable basis for such negotiations exists.

b. To support any legitimate proposal for action seeking peaceful solution to existing territorial problems within the framework of European, rather than national, interests, but to avoid giving official encouragement to German territorial aspirations toward areas external to the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and Berlin, beyond acknowledgment of the established U.S. policy that no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, and that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.*

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d. To expose and exploit Soviet moves aimed at permanent partition of Germany and satellization of Eastern Germany.

* U.S. note to Soviet Government dated March 26, 1951.

5. Concerning Western Europe

- a. To enhance popular confidence in:
 - i. the peaceful future of a European Community, within an Atlantic Community, which includes the Federal Republic;
 - ii. the prospect of mutually beneficial relations with the Federal Republic;
 - iii. the determination of the Western world to strive for a unified, democratic Germany as a member of a viable European community; and
 - iv. the intentions of the Western Powers to safeguard the European Community against the resurgence of aggressive German nationalism.
- b. To produce among European leaders and people a realistic awareness of the deadly menace of Soviet expansionism and of the strength accruing to the USSR if Germany were included in the Soviet orbit.
- c. To stimulate the realization among Europeans that only a tremendous effort of imagination, productivity, and cooperation, far surpassing the present effort of the Atlantic Community, including Germany, will enable them to surmount this threat; and to convince them that the creative energies latent in the free societies, including Germany, when fully developed, will not only nullify the enemy's aggressive moves or plans but also raise the Western peoples to unprecedented levels of material and moral well-being.
- d. To promote the concept of the Atlantic Community so that it may be used to support and supplement the concept of European unity as the dynamic and unifying element of our psychological strategy in Europe.
- e. To create among the peoples of Western Europe a sense of positive participation in the international community which is now emerging.

6. Concerning France

In addition to the specific effect desired in paragraph 5 above:

- a. To stimulate popular acceptance of:
 - i. a genuine political settlement with the Federal Republic;
 - ii. the capability of the European Community, within the Atlantic Community, to develop for the common benefit German manpower, heavy industry, and steel production in such a way as to eliminate French fears.
- b. To provide reassurance that the distinctive historic culture of France can vigorously flourish within the framework of the European Community, including the Federal Republic.

7. Concerning Eastern Europe

- a. To stimulate popular suspicion of Soviet intentions with respect to Germany.
- b. To persuade Soviet-orbit peoples that a unified Germany integrated into a European Community is a guarantee against the revived German drive to the East.
- c. To convince Soviet-orbit peoples that the weakening of Soviet power in East Germany is a necessary prerequisite for their own liberation.
- d. To sustain the resistance of Soviet-orbit peoples toward the day when their active participation in their own liberation will be required.

SECTION V

DESIRED ACTIONS

Part A - General Guidance

1. In developing and carrying out the specific actions to implement pre-scribed tasks, psychological strategy must give attention to the following opportunities and handicaps which influence the courses of actions required for the psychological support of our policies in Europe and especially in Germany:

a. Opportunities.

- i. The friendly orientation of large parts of European nations toward the U.S. and their growing confidence in U.S. strength;
- ii. A strong sense of cultural and political identification in Germany with the West and the reservoir of good will created by U.S. political initiative and by ECA, MSA and other assistance for German rehabilitation;
- iii. The existence in the Federal Republic of a government and population sympathetic towards the U.S. and its policies and opposed, largely through personal experience, to communism and to the policies of the Soviet Union; and
- iv. The steady decline of the strength of the West German Communist Party.

b. Handicaps.

- i. The complexity and fluidity of the European political situation which has already on several occasions necessitated major adjustments of the U.S. tactical positions, and which will continue to require a flexible strategic psychological plan;
- ii. The present elimination of U.S. influence on European government and peoples coinciding with the need to

exert special U.S. pressures to induce Europeans to
take actions which appear to be in their own interests;
and

- iii. Allied with this, increasing sensitivity in Western Europe to U.S. intervention with the accompanying danger that at times strong U.S. political, economic, or psychological pressures may run the risk of self-defeat, unless offset by measures which emphasize that these programs will serve the best interests of the developing European and Atlantic Communities.

2. In order to gain the most effective support for U.S. policies by the German public, our approach must be conceived and carried out in a manner which is both palatable and persuasive to the German people. We must adjust our approach in accordance with the changes in public opinion and with impressions and impacts which various political, economic, and cultural issues have on the German psychological climate. This will require a major effort of imagination on the part of the U.S. operating agencies to develop new and more effective forms of psychological activities, and it implies a constant review of existing programs—including those recommended hereafter—in the light of their demonstrated effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

3. Our operations in Germany, furthermore, must be closely coordinated with our psychological strategy in other parts of the world, and to achieve maximum effect they should preferably be carried out within the framework of an integrated psychological strategy plan for Western Europe.

4. U.S. psychological operations designed for Germany and Western Europe should be guided by the following principles:

- a. While supporting programs endorsed by U.S. which promote European and Atlantic integration, e.g., the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, the European Defense Community, etc., we should avoid raising false expectations by committing the U.S. to a fixed timetable.

- b. Care should be taken in the application of any official pressure to primarily domestic issues of European states, in order to avoid the impression of excessive U.S. intervention.

c. In official statements or other forms of official propaganda, avoid over-extending our psychological objectives beyond established policies, thus arousing false, unlikely, or premature expectations.

d. Avoid artificially creating needs or desires for U.S. economic or financial aid.

e. In the furtherance of U.S. psychological strategy programs in the Federal Republic, indigenous pressures should be utilized or created that will parallel and support the attainment of U.S. political objectives, and at the same time instill in the Germans a sense of participation in the achievement of these objectives.

f. In fostering indigenous pressures through official and unofficial support of private groups and organizations the United States should:

- i. in official programs concentrate on those groups and organizations sympathetic to our policy-objectives which manifest strong spontaneous motivation and are financially self-sustaining; and avoid supporting organizations, groups, and individuals that are unable to win solid indigenous support;
- ii. in psychological programs, concentrate to the greatest possible extent on established organizations and media, and limit the use of imaginary sponsors in the Federal Republic.

g. In order to create a psychological climate in which the new U.S.-German relationship will be more effective, avoid emphasizing purely legal and formal aspects of this relationship;

h. Wherever possible, propaganda by deed is preferable to verbal propaganda. Our propaganda should, therefore, be tied to specific developments and concrete action designed to implement U.S. policies. Moreover, we should seek to express our themes, whenever appropriate, in the form of live demonstrations and special events which will effectively symbolize U.S. attitudes and intentions. We should encourage increased emphasis by German or other European organizations on constructive social

and cultural activities, and on serious research.

i. In supporting German (or other West European) activities in promotion of European or Atlantic solidarity, we should give higher priority to those which actually establish institutional links with other countries than to those which merely publicize the idea within Germany or any single country.

Part B - Capabilities

1. Since psychological strategy programs involve all United States actions and means which are able to influence people's attitudes directly and indirectly, all elements of the United States Government and appropriate private U.S. organizations or conducting activities that affect Germany, should be enlisted in the execution of the United States psychological strategy plan for Germany. In the Federal Republic the following capabilities already exist or should be developed:

a. United States State Department representatives in the Federal Republic including those responsible for the Department's Cultural Affairs and Information program, will continue to be in a position to influence the Federal Republic Government by direct representations and will also be able to have an indirect influence upon Federal Republic official in government and the public at large through business and social contacts.

b. Members of official United States economic and military missions to the Federal Republic have a corresponding capability for influencing German official and private attitudes.

c. United States military forces and their dependents stationed in Germany in fulfillment of United States security pledges to NATO and the Federal Republic, constitute an important medium for conveying an impression of American and its people to the German population.

d. The policies and administration of United States military and defense support programs in the Federal Republic, carried on by the

Mutual Security Agency, can make a significant contribution to United States psychological strategy for Germany, and should be conceived and directed with this in mind.

e. Official statements of United States policies by recognized U.S. Government spokesmen in Washington which affect the Federal Republic, must be calculated and fully used to further psychological strategy objectives.

f. Efforts should also be encouraged among private firms, agencies, associations, etc. A suggestive list of such instrumentalities may be found in "Inventory of Resources Presently Available for Psychological Operations Planning" (P.S.D-19, Confidential, dated Jan. 5, 1952), previously furnished to the Departments and Agencies concerned.

g. In addition to developing and using the psychological capabilities of official U.S. Government agencies, instrumentalities, and individuals, the U.S. Government within its capabilities should continue to use and further develop other mechanisms (Annex B) ^{*} in the Federal Republic and West Berlin which have the greatest potential to attain U.S. psychological strategy objectives, and to accomplish the Tasks enumerated in SECTION IV.

2. Other capabilities of the United States related to the Soviet Zone or East Berlin are:

a. The U.S. military mission to the Soviet military command in Potsdam;

b. U.S. diplomatic and military contacts with Soviet Occupation authorities in Berlin;

c. U.S. diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.;

d. U.S. representation in the U.N.; and

e. State Department information media.

3. In developing our psychological strategy, we should be aware of and guided by the changing military and economic factors apt to modify the current relationship of forces between the Western nations and the U.S.S.R.

4. The balance of this SECTION describes and assigns responsibilities for the execution of specific actions to be taken by departments, agencies, and

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instrumentalities of United States Government, in carrying out the psychological strategy Tasks as stated in SECTION IV, for the Federal Republic, West Berlin, the Soviet Zone, East Berlin, and Germany as a whole.

Part C - Recommended Actions

Federal Republic

1. Transformation of Allied-Federal Republic relationship:

a. Continue to explain to the Germans, with the cooperation of the U.K. and France, the Federal Republic's new status under the Contractual Agreements, eg., interpret the reserved powers under the Agreements in a manner consistent with this new relationship; continue to give appropriate explanation to such controversial provisions of the Agreements as the Emergency Clause and the War Criminals issue; and stress the advantages and prestige accruing to the Federal Republic.

b. Encourage, and where feasible, discreetly publicize actions by American, French and British diplomatic, military and economic and cultural representatives in the Federal Republic, and by other nations which lend substance to the new relationship between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic; also where possible stimulate reciprocal actions by the Germans.

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c. Encourage appropriate behaviour and attitudes on the part of U.S. U.K., France, and EDC forces and their dependents stationed in the Federal Republic toward its forces and people, including the reduction of unjustified special privilege facilities of the defense forces, and the removal of symbolic reminders of the Occupation such as foreign language signs (except those required for military purposes) etc.

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d. Encourage where appropriate reciprocal U.S.-Federal Republic information, cultural, and technical activities such as exchanges of persons and media on a quid pro quo basis, and minimize German antagonisms toward use

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of the Federal Republic as a base for Western operations, by such actions as:

- i. Continuing and expanding the coordination with appropriate Federal Republic authorities of U.S. propaganda and the activities directed toward East Germany; and
- ii. Facilitating the development of Federal Republic foreign information and cultural programs.

25X1

2. Federal Republic integration into the Western European and free world communities.

a. Assist the government of the Federal Republic in developing psychological strategy oriented toward obtaining maximum support among the Germans for European integration.


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b. Keep alive and strengthen German understanding and interest in international cooperation through participation, when feasible, in appropriate international agencies and organizations. Support and publicize activities of international organizations such as GATT, OEEC, etc., in which Germany already participates and whose aim it is to facilitate the development of mutually beneficial facilities. (For various reasons, beyond U.S. control, German participation in certain international organizations, e.g., NATO and UN, is not possible under present conditions. Therefore, we should avoid stimulating premature expectations in Germany of early membership).

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c. Through psychological and political media and techniques discredit and reduce the influence of communist, communist front, neutralist, and pacifist opposition to integration.

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


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
e. Assist by appropriate support political, economic, religious, cultural and other groups in the Federal Republic (especially youth) which are working towards the maximum identification of German national interests with those of the European community.

i. Material and other assistance to German information media working towards the same goal;

ii. Support and publicity for political, economic, religious, cultural and other activities on an international scale which are oriented toward integration.



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


g. Support and publicize U.S. and other countries' diplomatic and other efforts to allay fears of Germany, especially in France, and conversely efforts by the Federal Republic to accept not only the rights but also the obligations inherent in an inter-dependent and reliable community of nations.



25X1

h. Support and publicize the exchange of military personnel and technical military experts between the Federal Republic and other Western countries through attendance at Allied military schools, exchanges of military observers, etc.



25X1

*limited distribution only.

[REDACTED]

j. When appropriate for a play-back for Germany, encourage the widest publicity in Western Europe for indications of genuine and spontaneous non-German popular support for Western-oriented German unification.

[REDACTED]

3. Development of democratic institutions in opposition to authoritarian and extremist elements.

a. Through official and private channels and especially cultural, and information activities, encourage the Federal Republic Government to sponsor democratic educational and governmental practices, and to hinder the entry by undemocratic elements into the educational system, military leadership, and Government administration.

[REDACTED]

b. Encourage and assist the Federal Republic in establishing civilian control of the Federal Republic's armed forces and their responsiveness to government policy and the selection for training of officers' and non-commissioned officers' cadres, oriented to Western democracy.

[REDACTED]

c. Through psychological and political techniques and media, as indicated in Annex B* discredit and weaken the strength and influence of neo-nazi and other authoritarian and extremist elements in the Federal Republic.

[REDACTED]

*limited distribution only.

d. Encourage Federal Republic political organizations friendly to the U.S. to devote high priority to youth recruitment and to the appointment of qualified youths to positions of leadership.

25X1

e. Stimulate and develop deviationism within the German Communist Party.

25X1

f. Assist German authorities and private organizations with the development of plans and programs designed to integrate expellees and defectors into the West German Community, to alleviate current hardships, to utilize their skills and experiences for the welfare and security of the Federal Republic, to foster their loyalty to established authorities and policies, and thus to turn potential elements of insecurity into reliable supporters of the Federal Republic and of the Western nations.

25X1

g. Discreetly support democratic elements in such organizations of political, cultural, and economic nature as universities, veterans' organizations, and refugee groups in order to channel their efforts towards the constructive stabilization of democracy and opposition to totalitarianism of either extreme Right or Left.

25X1

h. Assist and publicize developments in civic responsibility, such as public discussions of community problems and similar projects; simultaneously support and publicize actions by the Federal Republic authorities to control undemocratic elements within the country.

25X1
25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1

4. Gain Federal Republic peoples' support for U.S. policies, increase their confidence in the U.S. and Western ability to frustrate Soviet-Communist aggression, and strengthen their will to resist.

a. Same Actions as for Tasks Nos. 1 and 2.

b. Through diplomatic and military channels, and through all available media, stress U.S. determination to honor its NATO commitments in defending Europe, the growing strength and strategic superiority of the West, and any weakening of the Soviet political, psychological, and strategic military position.

[REDACTED] 25X1

c. Demonstrate U.S. and European military strength through suitable military displays, and through excellence of military discipline of U.S. forces.

[REDACTED] 25X1

5. Stimulate Federal Republic contribution to the development of increased economic and military strength in Western Europe.

a. cf Actions under paragraph 2.

b. Continue to develop and publicize plans for increase productivity in the Federal Republic.

[REDACTED] 25X1

c. Stimulate organs of public opinion to expose and demand action against illegal trade transactions.

[REDACTED] 25X1

d. Stimulate Federal Republic confidence in the opportunities for trade with the West and with the free world as a whole.

[REDACTED] 25X1

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- e. Develop greater understanding in the Federal Republic of motives lying behind Soviet trade with non-Communist countries; e.g. development of economic self-sufficiency in the Soviet bloc in order to make it independent of non-Communist trade.



25X1

- f. Publicize developments related to the control of East-West trade which demonstrate that the Federal Republic is treated on the basis of equality.



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Berlin

(Actions being developed in separate Supplement, to implement NSC 132/1).

Soviet Zone and East Berlin


1. Encourage disaffection and defection.

- a. Through official information media, such as RIAS, VOA, and

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disseminate information calculated to help create a climate conducive to disaffection by presenting a favorable picture of the free world and exposing the Soviet/Communist regime in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.



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
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3. Informing Soviet Zone population of world events.

a. Disseminate pertinent information to the Soviet Zone and East Berlin population on the broadest possible basis through all available information media.



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4. Maintain Soviet Zone/East Berlin hope for unified democratic Germany in European Community.

a. Employ all available psychological media to convey to the Soviet Zone/East Berlin population evidence of U.S. and Western determination to achieve German unity on suitable terms (see para 4a, p.9) to stress the benefits of such unity (in contrast to the communist formula), and to show

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evidences of growing Western strength and Communist weakness.



25X1

5. Weaken Soviet-Communist confidence in their ability to maintain or strengthen their position in Soviet Zone/East Berlin, or to use this area as a firm base for operations against the Federal Republic or West Berlin.

a. Through all available psychological techniques and media, bring to the attention of Soviet authorities, the effects of selected activities under Actions 1 and 2 above, which are indicative of growing popular resistance attitudes and lessening reliability of the Soviet/Communist control apparatus.*



25X1

German Unity

1. Demonstrate willingness to negotiate.

a. Through all available psychological and political techniques and media, give the widest possible play to official

*(NOTE: Actions 1 and 2 themselves will have direct impact on Soviet/Communist confidence).

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U.S. and Western statements favorable to German Unity.



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
b. Through official spokesmen and official information media, convey evidences of U.S. attitude to the German people.



25X1

2. Avoid official encouragement of German territorial aspirations beyond acknowledgement of stated policy.

a. Official spokesmen and official information media should not take initiative in raising Oder-Neisse and Saar issues, but should stand on previous U.S. policy statements if forced by circumstances to treat the subject.



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3. Other coverage of Oder-Neisse and Saar issues.



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25X1

4. Expose and counter Soviet moves toward permanent partition.

a. Use all available techniques and media to publicize Soviet measures, such as border controls, diplomatic actions, and militarization of Soviet Zone, which belie Soviet unification pretensions and evidence the transformation of Soviet Zone/East Berlin into a satellite state.

25X1

b. Use Actions under para 4 above (p. 26) to further this Task.

25X1

SECTION VI

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

A. Coordination, Review and Evaluation

The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible for continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic Plan and departmental and agency supporting plans and operations. The Director, in his discretion, may establish in Washington, D.C., a coordinating panel of interested departments and agencies.

B. Supporting Plans

Supporting plans prepared by the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director for Mutual Security shall be submitted to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, for review and such coordination as is necessary.

C. Legislative

Congressional support for legislation necessary to further the objectives of this plan will be developed by the Departments and Agencies concerned in accordance with normal programming procedures. In addition, the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board, using the resources of the PSB member Departments and Agencies and of other Departments and Agencies of the Government, will review other current and proposed legislation which impinges on or importantly affects the strategic psychological objectives of the United States in Germany and Western Europe. Based on this review, he will recommend such Board action as seems appropriate and desirable in relation to the successful execution of this Plan.

D. Public Information

Where appropriate, U.S. domestic public information programs in support of the general objectives of this Plan will be developed by the member Departments and Agencies.

ANNEX A
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

(Keyed to SECTION III A: ASSUMPTIONS)

Assumption No. 1: Over-all strategy

Within the over-all U.S. world strategy [of building positions of strength], the U. S. strategy for Europe is to build up the strength of Western Europe through measures to achieve its political, economic, social, and military integration with special emphasis on the integration of Germany into the Western Europe community. Simultaneous with measures to strengthen Western Europe to a point where its power is tactically equivalent to Soviet power in the European area, the U.S. will seek to bring about the reduction and eventual elimination of Soviet aggressive capabilities through weakening its military, economic, political, and psychological capabilities.

A further U.S. objective is to achieve a unified democratic Germany that is fully integrated into the Western Europe community. This would be predicated upon a Soviet withdrawal from all of Germany and would in turn afford a basis for further actions designed to weaken Soviet power and aggressive capabilities throughout the remaining Soviet sphere of influence. Efforts to weaken Soviet aggressive capabilities must, however, be continuously sustained whether or not German unity is achieved in order to discourage the Soviet Union from precipitating a third world war.

Assumption No. 2: Balance of Power

Western strength may be developed to a point of equivalence with Soviet power following the deployment of the Federal Republic's defense contribution of twelve divisions, provided that the military potential of other Western European countries is fully developed simultaneously. The Federal Republic's contribution will probably not be realized before 1954 or 1955. The Soviet Union will continue to have impressive capabilities for action in Asia and the Near East, which can be used to divert U.S. and Allied arms from Western Europe.

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Assumption No. 3: Cold War

Soviet objectives with regard to Germany will probably continue to be to gain ultimate control over all of Germany, or, failing that, to prevent the development and consolidation of Western strength through ratification and implementation of the Contractual and EDC Agreements. It is probable that the present tensions between the Soviet bloc and the West will continue indefinitely and increase in intensity.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union will employ all of its capabilities, short of deliberately provoking war, to further its aims. Soviet actions may range from diplomatic demarches to incidents involving the use of armed forces and military demonstrations, possibly including limited territory conflicts in which Germany may be involved but probably short of general war.

In the Federal Republic the USSR, working through the Communist Party and affiliated front and neutralist organizations will probably continue to capitalize on indigenous West German opposition to European integration, particularly that of the SPD, nationalists, and neutralist elements. In Eastern Germany and East Berlin the Soviet Union will probably continue its program to isolate these areas from the Federal Republic and West Berlin with a view to consolidating them into the Soviet satellite system. The development of an official East German army and the intensification of controls upon the East German population will complement the attainment of this objective.

Assumption No. 4: Integration

It is probable that the process of integrating the Federal Republic with the Western European Community through the EDC, the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, and similar organizations will continue, but that ratification of these agreements and their implementation will be impeded by oppositionist elements within and outside Germany. Even after the Bonn contractual, Schuman Plan, and EDC agreements have been ratified by the several parliaments, the integration of the Federal Republic into the EDC will

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have been achieved mainly on paper. Full realization of integration will continue to be impeded by the following factors:

- (a) Powerful political groups in the Federal Republic will continue to oppose the Adenauer government foreign policy, and popular support for this policy may be apathetic and wavering. The Socialist opposition is the most strongly organized, but there will also be a threat from the right wing nationalist groups and even from certain elements of the government coalition parties. The continued opposition of nationalist groups will aggravate the deep-rooted French suspicion of Germany and tend to undermine the Western defense edifice.
- (b) The historic misunderstandings between Germany and France, particularly on such issues as the Saar, may be aggravated by the propaganda activities of powerful French nationalist or neutralist groups opposed to the EDC program. In addition, deep-seated French fears that a revived Germany may dominate the EDC or resume its expansionist role may make France reluctant to implement Federal Republic integration into EDC.

Assumption No. 5: Contractuals

It is probable that the pro-Adenauer coalition government will honor the Contractual and EDC Agreements, but that these Agreements will be subject to demands by both coalition members and the opposition for liberalization and that there will be continuing pressure for abandonment of reserved rights. A Social Democratic victory in the 1953 elections would logically increase Western German demands for a revision of the contractual agreements and other commitments to the West.

Assumption No. 6: German Unity and Peace Treaty

German unification will remain one of the deepest aspirations of the German people in both East and West Germany. Even though the intensity

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of this aspiration may abate somewhat in the face of psychological and economic realities, it affords an issue which cannot be ignored in the strategies of either the Soviet Union or the U.S. Any unification in advance of integration, however, would so change the political basis of the German government as to create broad opportunities for the Soviet Union to bring about a Russo-German alliance. The psychological problem for the U.S. regarding the issue of German unity is made more difficult by the reluctance of many Germans, including some within the Adenauer coalition, to realize that integration is a strategic prerequisite. In contrast they tend to consider integration, as it has been presented thus far, as an obstacle imposed from the outside to the unity which is their first desire. Furthermore, many Germans see neutralized unification as a means toward regaining Eastern markets and raw materials.

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will agree to German unification on Western terms, except possibly when confronted with superior Western military forces, combined with mass resistance in Eastern Germany. Western efforts to exert pressures, adequate to bring about German unification before Western strength has reached its peak, would probably hasten a Soviet military attack. However, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union would barter Eastern Germany for a neutralized, unified Germany. In any case, whether willing or not to pursue such a course, the Soviets will probably continue to press for German unification on the basis of withdrawal of all foreign forces from German soil, guaranteed limits of German armament, and prohibition of "aggressive" alliances. They would hope thereby to dampen Western European and, particularly, French willingness to implement the European Defense Community and to increase the strains between the U.S. and its European allies.

Assumption No. 7: Berlin

It is not believed at this time that the Soviets plan to reimpose a full blockade of West Berlin. Present developments appear to be primarily part

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of the Soviet intimidation program, designed to prevent ratification of the Contractual and EDC Agreements, and, failing in this effort, to impose serious problems for Western policy subsequent to ratification. At the present time, the Soviet Union has capabilities for effectively restricting ground resupply and communication lines between Berlin and the Federal Republic, if it chooses to do so, and it can temporarily limit the effectiveness of an Allied airlift. However, it is unlikely for the moment that the Soviet Union will deliberately take steps in Berlin that are calculated to bring about a general war in Europe. Moreover, it is believed that the Soviets are unlikely to impose a complete blockade at this time upon Berlin, because to do so would consolidate Western, and particularly West German anti-Soviet opinion and hasten, rather than retard, ratification. Definitive action on the part of the Soviets is, therefore, likely to await action on the ratification of the Agreements.

A collapse of the Western position in Berlin would have serious adverse psychological consequences in Western Germany, Western Europe, and throughout the Atlantic Community. In the event of a determined Soviet effort to eject the Western Powers from Berlin, the French and British Governments would probably join in a united agreement to resist by force, if need be, but at some cost in popular support, especially in the case of France.

Assumption No. 8: Soviet Zone and East Berlin

The Soviet Union is attempting to create a communist satellite in East Germany, and to make East German resources available to increase Soviet capabilities. It is probable that the population of the Soviet Zone will remain fundamentally opposed to communism. So long as this opposition exists, Soviet control in Eastern Germany will have to rely upon military occupation or use the MGB-communist terror apparatus. Although it is probable, therefore, that East Germany will constitute a psychological liability for the Soviet Union, it is to be noted that the Soviet Zone is the second most important industrial area in the Soviet bloc outside of the U.S.S.R., and

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provides a major base for Soviet operations against Western Europe.

It is probable that further steps will be taken to complete the isolation of Eastern Germany and East Berlin from West Germany and West Berlin, and that the development of an Eastern German army will be furthered by the Soviet Union.

Assumption No. 9: Federal Republic Military and Economic Potential

Creation of the planned Federal Republic military force (equivalent to 12 ground divisions plus tactical air and naval patrol forces) must await not only full ratification of the EDC treaty, which is not expected before late 1952, but also the organization of economic and industrial support, both within the Federal Republic and from abroad.

The trained military manpower and untrained manpower pool available in the Federal Republic are ample for the creation of the planned force within two or three years of ratification.

Economic and industrial support for this force in the Federal Republic must await the development of machinery within the Bonn Government for planning and programing the economic aspects of the defense effort. Given the creation of this machinery and adequate outside support, the Federal Republic's potential will make possible an economic contribution to the defense of the West far more than equivalent to the materiel requirements of her own forces. The Federal Republic will be barred, for the present, by the EDC Agreement and other commitments, from making certain categories of items, e.g. atomic weapons and civil aircraft.

Domestic opposition to the required legislation for the military force, and to the actual organization of the forces, will stem generally from the same sources opposing the integration policy (see Assumption #4 and discussion). However, opposition is likely to be more bitter in the case of conscription and industrial conversion, which adversely affect or threaten the personal fortunes of large groups for the sake of a policy which many Germans see as imposed by the United States against their country's interests.

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~~Assumptions Nos. 10 and 11: Western Europe--France in Particular~~

French attitudes toward the German problem are characterized by two basic fears -- the fear of domination by a Germany once more powerful, and the fear of war through action in Germany which might provoke Soviet military retaliation. If these fears apply to the integration and remilitarization of the Federal Republic, they apply still more to any attempts to bring about German unification, except, perhaps, on a basis of neutralization and demilitarization. The margin by which France is likely to accept the lesser risks of integration is small enough to suggest that any serious attempt to promote German unification against Soviet opposition would adversely affect French relations with NATO and might bring to power a neutralist government in France.

French anxieties over the German problem prompt France to seek greater unity and strength in Western Europe and greater and more reliable support from the Atlantic Community as a whole, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. All such developments would tend to balance the apparent threat to France from both Germany and the Soviet Union. In this sense the French attitude depends on such factors as the course of the war in IndoChina; the strength of United States and British forces on the Continent; the rate of development of French economic and military power; the firmness of United States and British support for the integrity of the EDC; and the degree to which the Federal Republic can convince the French of its firm adherence to the integration policy.

Assumption No. 12: Eastern Europe.

There is no indication that any of the countries of the Soviet Orbit is capable of breaking away from, or achieving a significant relaxation of, Soviet control in the foreseeable future, short of a great weakening in the power of the U.S.S.R.

Generally, the peoples of the Soviet Orbit countries hope for eventual liberation. Exception must be made for those classes which benefit directly from participation in the hierarchy of control; for the Bulgarians, to the extent that anti-Russian feeling historically is far less intense in Bulgaria than in other Orbit countries; and for some economic classes, mainly poor peasants, which have improved their lot under the Soviet-

Fear of renewed German domination is most intense in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, which experienced the worst of the Nazi conquest. In Slovakia considerable pro German feeling survives, partly reflecting the mildness of the puppet regime which governed there during World War II. Pro-German feeling is also considerable in the Baltic States. In the Western Ukraine, despite the Nazi excesses of the war, there may remain a latent good will for the Germans, reflecting strong antipathy for the Soviet regime. Hungary and Rumania are both characterized by much more intense hatred and fear of the Russians than of the Germans.

The above sentiments toward Germany are only partly conditioned by Soviet propaganda, which paints the Bonn Republic as the "heir of all Hitlerian atrocities" and the "slave of Wall Street", while East Germany is portrayed as a workers' state and therefore, by definition, peace-loving. The latter impression has been reinforced by East Germany's public disavowal of any territorial ambitions toward the Oder-Neisse lands. In the event of German unification, it may be assumed that the Soviet propaganda line in Eastern Europe would shift to unqualified anti-Germanism.

by

Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University.

I. Background

The importance of Germany in Europe hardly requires restatement. It is the most highly industrialized country on the Continent; its disciplined labor forces and its deposits of raw materials make it in many respects the keystone of American efforts in Europe. It was hoped that the signing of the Peace Treaty would transform Germany into a willing partner of the Atlantic community; its contribution all the more meaningful because freely given. It was assumed that a feeling of satisfaction would greet the achievement of quasi-sovereignty only seven years after unconditional surrender culminating a remarkable recovery inconceivable as late as 1948.

Such has not been the case, however. This writer spent several weeks in Germany at a period coinciding with the signing of the Peace Treaty. During this time he was in a position to visit various sections of Germany and to talk to a wide range of individuals. German reaction to the Peace Treaty and to U.S. policy in general can best be summed up as "hysterical". Whether expressed as the refusal by the Laender of Adenauer's request that the Peace Treaty be celebrated by school holidays and by the exhibition of flags on public buildings; whether revealed in newspaper editorials or in conversations of leading figures, the Peace Contract and its companion instruments have led to an outburst of anti-American feeling totally out of proportion to the specific criticism advanced. No indigenous advocate of the U.S. position has yet appeared. Even Adenauer and, more markedly, his supporters tend to support the Peace Contract as making the best of a bad situation and advocate its ratification merely because it exists (See F.E. Adenauer's interview with Friedlaender, the Editor of *Die Zeit*.). Under these circumstances the consequences of the Peace Treaty may be totally different from what had been hoped. It is certain that in the present psychological climate a German contribution to the West European Defense Force will be of doubtful usefulness. What is the source of this German distrust of the U.S. extending over all sections of the population and threatening to ruin the whole German policy of the U.S.?

II. Specific German Criticisms

German criticism of the U.S. focuses on the Peace Treaty, on rearmament and on the problem of German unity. Specific criticisms tend to vary with the interests of the group concerned, but it is fair to state that they are general and are reducible to one underlying cause: A pervasive distrust of the U.S.

The criticism of the Peace Contract takes many forms, most of it directed against the U.S. The decartelization clause is considered by many an infringement of the very sovereignty the Treaty attempts to restore. The industrialists naturally deplore the clause for obvious reasons. But it is opposed almost as violently by the SPD as another example of U.S. encouragement of "reactionary free enterprise capitalism". The provision regarding the review of sentences of war criminals has aroused the violent opposition of veterans' groups. Many individuals who really have a vested interest in rearmament balk because of this alleged slur on the honor of the German army. The former Chief of Staff of the German High Command expressed a general attitude to the writer when he stated: "If I am going to be asked about the staffing of the German Officers' Corp, I shall recommend that its personnel be drawn from the ranks of the lawyers, so that they will know how to behave after the war."

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These criticisms may be unreasonable and would probably be much less effective had Soviet propaganda not succeeded in stimulating a two-fold fear: a) that the Peace Treaty perpetuates (or in the words of a leading FDP politician "eternizes") the division of Germany, and b) that rearmament will make war inevitable. Soviet propaganda has succeeded in shifting the onus for the division of Germany on the U.S. The apparent rejection of the Soviet proposal for a four-power conference has made ratification of the Peace Treaty by the Bundestag extremely difficult. The pressure for unification is powerful and cannot be assuaged by a priori assertions of Soviet bad faith. A leading member of Adenauer's party told this writer that the bad faith of the Soviet Union could not have been better exposed than through a four-power conference; that in his opinion a peace treaty should have been advertised as a last resort not as the beginning of a new era in European policies. This is undoubtedly the motivation behind the recent advocacy of a four-power conference by Jacob Kaiser, Adenauer's Minister for All-German Affairs, who is certainly an ardent anti-Communist.

In an atmosphere which is becoming increasingly inflexible because of the pressures of both the SPD and extreme right-wing groups the government coalition finds its position almost untenable if it constantly is forced to defend itself against charges of being an instrument of the Allies (see Schumacher's description of Adenauer as Chancellor of the Allies). Much of the anti-American bitterness of particularly the FDP is due to their belief that American policy puts them before impossible alternatives: Either to leave the government coalition or to vote for unpopular measures and commit political suicide. On the day of the ratification of the Peace Treaty this writer dined with the head of the Foreign Policy Commission of the FDP. He was greeted by his host with the words, "Why did you do this to us?"

The psychological effect of the Peace Treaty is further reduced by the fact that it was tied to a Defense Pact. Even more than in Japan, this is construed as a form of blackmail, as granting sovereignty to achieve essentially American ends in the U.S. strategy against Russia. But rearmament is opposed for other reasons as well. The younger generation is cynical and bitter. Having witnessed the collapse of Germany after fighting a hopeless war for several years, they are disillusioned and "neutralist". In conversations with university youth a pacifist strain with religious overtones appears, not easily overcome by a leadership with as little prestige as the present West German government. Others oppose rearmament on the basis of military considerations. They emphasize the indefensibility of the Elbe, Allied troop dispositions which point to a stand at the Rhine and to the futility of fighting a rear-guard action which will again leave Germany devastated and many hostages in Soviet hands.

III. Psychological Climate

The above remarks are perhaps one-sided. The sympathies of many, if not most, Germans are with the West. But they are not vocal. Their feelings are not organized and however opposed to the Soviet Union, they are often as distrustful of the U.S., though not as afraid. The real dilemma of the U.S. position in Germany does not derive from the specific complaints advanced, but from a general lack of confidence in the U.S. which prevents the creation of a psychological climate for the execution of integrated, long-range policies and which prevents the Germans from seeing such measures as the Atlantic Pact in terms of their own interest.

It is, of course, unfortunate that it should have been the Peace Contract which became the focal point of the frustration and resentments of the past fifteen years. Perhaps it would have been wiser to sign a Peace Contract only after the failure of a four-power conference; to keep the Peace Contract very short and to leave such details as decartelization and the disposition of war criminals for negotiation with a sovereign West Germany as an implementing instrument of the Peace Contract. Rearmament, too, would be psychologically much more meaningful were it negotiated by a government already sovereign, rather than by one seemingly accepting it as the price of sovereignty.

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complaints except as symptoms of a more fundamental resentment. Indeed an attempt to meet specific criticisms by ad hoc measures would probably worsen rather than improve the situation in two ways: a) they would be taken as another symptom of American weakness and encourage the notion that intransigence is the best bargaining weapon in dealing with the U.S. This seeming weakness would make the Germans all the more nervous since it would be interpreted as the reverse side of Soviet strength. b) Any concessions, although they would remove specific criticisms, would probably raise others as has proved to be the case through the past four years. They would, if anything, increase the existing bitterness by intensifying the prevalent self-righteousness and frustration. They would be taken as one more indication that the U.S. never understands what really moves the German people; that it is talking about legal instruments while the Germans describe an historical experience.

This gives a tragic and almost inextricable quality to American-German relations. The Germans have experienced three upheavals in the past thirty years: the collapse of the Empire, of the Weimar Republic, of Nazi Germany. The older generation is of a cynicism that knows only one impetus: to be, by all means, on the winning side next time. The younger generation is confused and groping. American invocations of a Communist peril seem to them all too reminiscent of the propaganda of Goebbels and all too shallow in terms of their own experience with the Soviet Union.

Germany, too, is just emerging from the shock of defeat and of denazification and demilitarization, and from the expulsion of millions of its cities from East Germany and from economic chaos. Denazification has created a sense of identification among many former party members and denazification is ascribed, rightly or wrongly, to the U.S. A leading civil servant told this writer that up to the American Occupation and his own imprisonment he had considered the SS sub-human, but that the internment camp had taught him their qualities. The memory of a period when America was speaking of "reeducation", of the villainy of German militarism and authoritarianism is still pervasive and is constantly invoked in conversations. The sudden shift of American policy in 1950 is considered by most Germans not as magnanimity but as utter cynicism. Above all, the Germans are weary and almost neurotic and any exhortation is apt to be resented because of its very existence. The fear of a new war, new bombings, and new occupation is pervasive.

Americans attempt to deal with these frustrations with an open-minded matter-of-factness. They examine the "objective" merit of individual complaints; more often than not they meet German objections. They speak of the evils of Communism, but not in terms which mean anything to the Germans--and, therefore, they compound German bitterness, German self-righteousness and the feeling that Americans simply are incapable of understanding. The editor of a leading German cultural and political review, a former inmate of a concentration camp, a man of considerable influence in intellectual circles told this writer: "If an American visits my friends or myself, we always have a very pleasant conversation. But afterwards we feel like throwing the nearest convenient object against a wall. We simply cannot stand this 'Goddamned American good-will' any longer. We would like to talk about things that move us, whose solution, I assure you, is not to be achieved by good will."

It is this feeling of impotent frustration with Americans that accounts for the present stalemate in Germany. The ratification of the Peace Contract will not remove it; on the contrary, it will intensify it and cause the election next year to be fought on issues of narrow nationalism and freedom from subservience to the U.S. One should not count much on the often-expressed dislike of the Soviet Union. To be sure, the USSR is disliked, and even hated, but it is also respected and feared--and this may suffice for the neutralization of Germany. It is significant that Remer, who in the U.S. was called General Clay a petty criminal (Halunke) has not used similar epithets against Soviet commanders--even from the safety of the Western zones.

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the reverse of a disdain for the U.S. There has grown up a stereotype of the American as arrogant, brutal, inconsiderate, without sensibilities and animated by a shallow cynicism. A recent survey by the Institute für Sozial-Forschung in Frankfurt illustrates this point. A sample of Germans in the Western zones of Germany were asked to compare the national characteristics of Germans, Russians, and Americans on the points mentioned above. In every instance the Germans were predictably considered most favorably (least arrogant, least brutal, etc.), but surprisingly on every point the Americans appeared as worse than the Russians. (More people thought Americans were brutal or arrogant, than Russians.)

Another example may be permissible. A leading German intellectual told the following story to this writer. During the non-fraternization period Cardinal Faulhaber met the Commanding General of the U.S. troops occupying Munich and extended his hand as a greeting. The American General refused to accept it. At the same time, the Bishop of Trier met a French General. He, too, extended his hand but the French General, obedient to his orders, refused to shake it. An hour later, a French civilian visited the Bishop of Trier and demonstratively extended his hand. It was the French General. The story, this writer's acquaintance points out, was apocryphal, but it was plausible. He Germans, he added, would never believe it were an American substituted for the Frenchman.

These attitudes are the real source of U.S. difficulties in Germany, if not in Europe. They facilitate Soviet propaganda because they make even the most outrageous fabrication psychologically plausible. The attacks on General Ridgeway as General Microbe may not convince Europeans that the U.S. is engaging in germ warfare in Korea. They do add to the picture of an overbearing U.S. bullying small nations. The lack of confidence in the U.S. makes even friendly governments tentative in their defense of measures they inwardly agree to. No indigenous advocates arise to defend U.S. policies with even a fraction of the fervor of their critics. This puts the burden of defense squarely on organs officially identified with the U.S.: the Voice of AMERICA, the America Houses, and American-sponsored publications such as the Monat and Die Neue Zeitung. And, in this manner, policies such as rearmament and the Peace Treaty are even more clearly labeled as American, not as German, policies and become even more vulnerable.

The German situation is critical; not because Germany is apt to go Communist--there is practically no danger of this. The real threat is that a nationalist reaction fed on a dogmatic anti-Americanism may bring to power a government which will lean on the USSR to achieve its independence from the West whatever its ideological differences. This reverse Titoism is by no means impossible and may be encouraged by the violent debate the Peace Contract and rearmament are certain to evoke.

IV. A Psychological Program

The fundamental cause of the difficulties of the U.S. position in Germany can be summarized as follows: The U.S. has attempted to create a framework of legal relationships and neglected the psychological climate which would make these relationships effective. In attempting to do so, the U.S. has frequently acted as if German participation in the Western Defense Community depended on its approbation of the U.S. It has consequently attempted to meet specific complaints. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has pursued its minimum objective, the neutralization of Germany by emphasizing the German interests involved, with little regard for approbation. Indeed, German hatred of the Soviet Union may be a Soviet asset, for it is based on a fear which paralyzes all action. By advocating German unity, by playing on German fears of rearmament, by emphasizing the devastation of Korea, they are creating the conditions of a neutralism which seems achievable only by opposition to the U.S.

The U.S. will not be able to remedy its position until it emphasizes the psychological component of its political strategy. This is all the more true as the power to influence events directly is rapidly slipping out of the hands of the U.S. It should be the aim of any U.S. psychological effort to create

indigenous pressures which parallel the main lines of U.S. policies. This program involves a technical and a substantive aspect: a consideration of the conceptions underlying U.S. psychological strategy and a discussion of its form and content.

American propaganda in Germany has stressed a mass appeal and official auspices: the Voice of America, officially sponsored publications, and America Houses. But this inevitably compounds U.S. difficulties. Twelve years of Nazi rule and seven years of military occupation have left a residue of distrust of the printed word, particularly from official sources. Indeed the more unofficial the source, the greater is credibility; the more obscure a rumor, the stronger its impact. Officially-sponsored publications moreover suffer from the very inhibitions they attempt to remove; they tend to reach only those who are already convinced. This distrust of official sources, in particular those identified with the Occupation, is best revealed by the difficulty faced by former staff members of the Neue Zeitung in finding new employment. The Voice of America again aims for a mass appeal. Its impact on the opinion-forming segment of the population seems doubtful.

It is, however, precisely the opinion-making element of the population (leading intellectuals, political figures, editors, etc.) who are the source of U.S. difficulties in Germany. It is their distrust of U.S. intentions which creates an atmosphere of rigidity for policy makers. This distrust is all the more pervasive because this group on the whole knows extremely little about the U.S. Throughout his travels this writer met a surprising number of influential Germans who had had almost no contact with Americans. It is fair to say that German reaction to U.S. official personnel, both HICOG and Army, is extremely mixed. Typical attitudes were that they represented "second-rates" or that they constituted a means to relieve unemployment in the U.S. The writer is in no position to pass on the merit of these complaints; on the other hand, their existence is an objective fact of considerable importance.

For these reasons neither official sources nor official personnel are in a position to fundamentally affect the psychological climate. It is therefore important to create a basis of understanding on an unofficial basis on all levels by sending a few, highly selected individuals to Germany, to give them a "cover" which will permit them to travel widely and to establish contacts. A university, large foundation, newspaper and similar organizations would seem most suitable. Many doubts could well be resolved in such a manner and on an unofficial basis; many questions could be answered before they become political issues. Above all, it is important to engage Germans and Americans on cooperative projects so that by working together a community of interests might be created. This could take the form of study groups, cultural congresses, exchange professorships and intern programs, wherever possible under non-governmental auspices.

Exchange programs are undoubtedly useful. On the other hand, the German youth would be even more effectively reached through a number of young Americans strategically placed into key universities. Their selection as of all personnel for these programs should not be on the basis of paper qualifications but should stress understanding of German conditions, personality and inward aliveness. It is, above all, crucial to find individuals who can assist in removing the German feeling that America never "understands," that it is cynically sacrificing weaker nations to its overall purposes.

There exists in Germany a large undercurrent of hatred of the Soviet-Union kept alive by expellees from Eastern Germany, by former prisoners of war in Russia and by Russian behavior in Eastern Germany. Nevertheless, this feeling cannot gain expression because it is unorganized and lacks a focus. It should be possible to encourage German structures to channel these feelings: associations of former war prisoners (probably existing clandestinely in any case) might provide excellent vehicles.

There exists also the problem of gaining some influence over veterans groups. This all the more important because their power is constantly growing. In this task the army in Germany might help by inviting German

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equipment, by inviting some addresses and similar measures. Many of these measures may appear unpalatable. Nevertheless the U.S. hardly has a choice. If the U.S. does not use these groups, they will be infiltrated by the Communists.

V. A Psychological Program - Possible Propaganda Measures

American propaganda in Germany has at various times employed the following themes: a) The Soviet danger is exaggerated and German fears are therefore unfounded. b) Soviet bad faith is so self-evident that it need hardly be discussed. c) The Peace Contract and rearmament are logical concomitants of "containment," d) The Soviet Union is so strong that the defense of Europe will be impossible without German divisions and the U.S. may be forced to abandon Germany without a German Defense contribution.

Almost none of these appeals has proved effective, because they tend to intensify German fears and leave unanswered the real German doubts. The German fear of the Soviet Union, born out of historical experience, cannot be assuaged by propaganda and should be frankly faced. Up to now it has had a paralyzing effect on German public opinion because the alternatives have been incorrectly stated: Either a German defense contribution and a U.S. defense of Europe or a "neutral Germany" to be perhaps occupied but not fought over. This has enabled the SPD, the right wing group and Soviet propaganda to play on German tiredness of war, the constant reiteration of which has become increasingly effective. It is clear that this fear cannot be overcome by minimizing the Soviet danger; the Germans know better--or think they know better, which in this case amounts to the same thing. Nor can it be dealt with by constant exhortations and calling attention to the need for a German defense contribution. These exhortations merely confirm German fears about the weakness of the U.S. and its own impotence vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.

The alternative should be differently posed: Either a German contribution to the defense of Germany and therefore some voice in its destiny or a defense of Germany, in any case, but as an impotent object of policy. In his conversations with Germans this writer posed these alternatives in somewhat the following terms: The major problem for Germany is not to avoid war, since that decision will depend on many factors outside Germany's control, primarily on the Soviet Union's estimate of the existing total power relationship. The major problem for Germany is to gain some voice in its destiny and in case of war some power to affect events. It was not certain whether Germany could survive another war; but it was quite certain that it could not survive a generation as impotent object of other policy. This approach always proved extremely effective.

Similarly, it is useless to defend the Peace Contract and Rearmament as easy, because "logical" decisions. It would be much wiser to show some compassion with the turmoil Germany is undergoing internally. American officials and American propaganda should state that we are well aware of German difficulties and hesitations; that the Peace Contract and rearmament are not easy measures, but that policy cannot wait for the coincidence of psychological receptivity and historical or political necessity; that Germany's spiritual contribution to the West at this stage may well consist of undergoing this spiritual turmoil and overcoming it. It is said in Germany that American officials advocate ratification of the Peace Contract to keep Senator Taft and isolationism from the Presidency. This could hardly constitute a reply to German fears.

The above arguments are obviously designed for the opinion-making segment of the population. For the majority of the population simple themes are necessary. The U.S. should not base its appeal on the self-evidence of Soviet bad faith. Rather it should attempt to constantly reiterate it - not in abstract terms of anti-Communist polemic but reinforced by concrete issues and grievances; treatment of prisoners, expulsions, standard of living, etc. These should not be reserved for occasional U.N. sessions but be constantly kept alive through posters, slogans, nucleus groups, etc. Above

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all, the U.S. should attempt to wrest the initiative in the psychological struggle from the U.S.S.R. All advantages in this effort are on the side of the U.S. German unity should not be permitted to be preempted by the Soviet Union. If the U.S. appeared as its advocate, much wind would be taken out of the sails of the SPD, right-wing and Soviet propaganda.

German youth is still uncommitted. Its skepticism will make it distrustful of slogans, but its latent idealism causes it to seek new values and new commitments. European unity exercises a powerful appeal on the German youth, though not in the form of economic and military integration. Here the spiritual unity of the West, advocated by individuals of high calibre, would provide a valuable focus of psychological efforts; to be complemented by organizational structures outlined above.

On another plane, the billeting procedures of the Army have provided a constant source of irritation. It hits hardest the very segment of the population potentially most friendly to the U.S., the middle class. By taking houses and barring the entry to their owners, the Army is creating bad feeling totally out of proportion to the importance of billeting. An attempt should be made to have the Army construct its own billeting facilities which could, after the Occupation, be turned over to the Germans. In this manner the presence of the Army could be considered a boon, instead of as at present, a blight.

The above measures represent only an outline of possibilities. No formal statement of a program can guarantee success. This is all the more true since our difficulties in Germany stem not from bad policies, but from bad timing and not from ill-conceived propaganda but from superficial implementation. There is no easy recipe for regaining confidence; there is no technical, pat solution to recapture the initiative in the war of ideas. It is clear, however, that a new approach is needed in Germany lest the latent anti-Americanism determines the shape of events and lest Germany be swallowed up by the Soviet orbit.

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